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Managing Residual Clearance:  
 Learning From Europe’s Past
by Samuel Paunila [ GICHD ]
Lessons learned from residual clearance in post-1945 Europe may apply to long-term clearance 







In light of current conflicts, it is easy to forget that many European countries still manage World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) contamination. Over decades, these countries devel-
oped practices and policies that could help shape priority set-
ting and risk management in countries more recently affected 
by ERW. Post-conflict countries could learn from the early 
mistakes in European responses and benefit from practical ap-
proaches that address residual threats at varying depths and 
with differing time frames. 
The historical evolution of best practices since WWII can 
also assist countries in policy design beyond the fulfillment of 
commitments under the international Convention for Cluster 
Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel Mine Ban 
Convention or APMBC). Understanding when to start and 
stop the implementation of proactive clearance serves as an 
excellent foundation for residual clearance policies.1 
Understanding Before Acting
One of the immediate challenges facing countries 
recovering from armed conflict is the prevention of further 
casualties from ERW contamination. After addressing 
immediate concerns, including protecting citizens and 
critical national infrastructure from explosive hazards, 
governments strive to secure safe environments for daily life 
and socioeconomic recovery.2 With internal and external 
pressures in play, the following limitations often characterize 
this early stage:
•	 No time for planning comprehensive surveys
•	 Inadequate information on the scale and impact of ERW 
contamination
•	 Policymakers’ inability to approach the threat of ERW 
through risk management. 
As a result, some countries provided ambiguous estimates regard-
ing years of ERW clearance required, adding to the confusion.3
From Proactive to Responsive
Responsible governments logically adopt a proactive 
approach to ERW during and immediately after armed 
conflict. Implementation usually involves a rapid survey 
covering large areas with clearance operations aiming for 
exhaustive eradication of ERW, at least in priority areas. 
With time and progress, these operations usually report a 
decline in ERW encountered and make priority and highly- 
contaminated areas safe from surface and shallow ERW. 
Meanwhile, institutional knowledge within the responsible 
authority improves on typology, extent and implications of 
the remaining contamination.4 With less ERW to address, the 
high costs of proactive clearance yields decreasing marginal 
returns and, in absolute terms, often debatable increases in 
public safety. The reduced threat from remaining ERW raises 
the need for the country to readjust its priorities and response 
policy to better reflect modern risk management.5
World War II Lessons
Several European and Asian countries experienced exten-
sive and prolonged bombardments from air, sea and land dur-
ing WWII, resulting in significant ERW contamination per 
square kilometer (247 ac) of territory.6 In fact, more than 30 
countries continue to discover  and clear WWII-era ERW. For 
instance, the U.K. regularly recovers deeply buried bombs 
from the greater London area. Many ERW remain at the bot-
tom of the River Thames. Germany’s experience of bomb-
ing during WWII was more intense and sustained, leaving a 
widespread legacy of surface and shallow contamination in 
cities and the countryside. Two million tons of ordnance were 
dropped, with an estimated 100,000 unexploded bombs re-
maining in present-day Germany.7 Up to 10 aircraft bombs 
are still found yearly in Berlin alone.
The intensity of the destruction in specific areas of the U.K. 
and Germany compares with the shelling and bombing of 
Laos and Vietnam, which began with the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954 and continued through the end of the Vietnam 
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War in 1973.8 Sixty years after the First Indochina War and 40 
years since the war in Vietnam, the management of residual 
ERW in this region is highly relevant and could benefit from a 
fresh perspective and transfer of knowledge. 
After WWII, European governments had to make major 
decisions on prioritization and public safety, assessing econ-
omies of scale in dealing with residual abandoned and un-
exploded ordnance. The primary regulator for the evolution 
of policies prior to establishment of the International Small 
Arms Control or International Mine Action Standards was 
common sense; not every square meter could or should be 
cleared in each area suspected of containing ERW. The con-
tamination had to be treated differently depending on if the 
ERW was at the surface or buried. Economic and infrastruc-
ture pressures often resulted in release of land to the popu-
lation before it was guaranteed that the land was safe to a 
specified depth. It was, and still is, every citizen’s responsibil-
ity to be vigilant and report ERW findings to local authorities. 
Evolution of Policies
Since 1945, countries’ responses to ERW evolved through 
a series of reality checks. On the one hand, authorities had to 
weigh the extent and type of contamination with the de facto 
danger to population and infrastructure. On the other hand, 
they needed to assess available technical and human resourc-
es, as well as their efficiency and associated costs. The reality 
of these competing priorities was no more apparent than in 
post-WWII London, where more than one million destroyed 
buildings needed to be rebuilt.9
The policies of that era were guided by early applications of 
risk management and implemented by experienced, yet often 
poorly equipped, operators and advisers. The first two decades 
after WWII could be described as a showcase of varying degrees 
of resilience in London and Berlin, learning from mistakes 
of unregulated work while pushing for new perspectives 
and procedures for ERW practices. During the 1970s, civil-
reporting mechanisms became more effective by moving 
data from war archives to the first interactive information-
management systems. The management of residual ERW soon 
evolved as a mechanism of shared responsibility with specified 
tasks for armed forces, emergency services, civil servants, 
citizenry, and more recently for commercial contractors. 
Proactive, Reactive, Responsive
The U.K.’s early ERW response policies were primarily 
reactive, and Germany implemented a combination of 
Balham underground station in Southwest London after a raid on the evening of 14 October 1941, when 68 people died after 
pipes burst causing water and silt to fill the station.
Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum.
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reactive and proactive policies. In both contexts, assessing, 
treating and reducing risk became a suitable approach to 
managing residual ERW. The policy implementation had to 
be transparent to the public, thus reflecting society’s values 
while including liability aspects in light of decreasing public 
tolerance toward ERW casualties.
Present ERW clearance in European countries is largely 
responsive compared to operations conducted immediately 
after WWII. Many of the affected countries now operate on 
the premise that ERW contamination cannot be totally elimi-
nated, but the hazards associated with remaining ERW can 
be mitigated through risk education, responsive local threat 
assessments and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).10 This 
assumption of acceptance of long-term residual risk and dif-
ferentiation between responses on surface, shallow and deep 
residual contamination starkly contrasts with the admirable 
yet abstract policies that continue advocating for total eradi-
cation of ERW.11,12
Emerging countries that experienced major bombard-
ments following the 1960s, such as Laos and Vietnam, com-
pleted most of their post-war reconstruction and now enter 
long-term development. However, some of their current con-
tracting and budgeting modalities encourage continued pro-
active ERW clearance over less expensive survey activities, 
land-use assessments and risk reduction through spot EOD.13 
Moreover, policymakers may overestimate the impact of ERW, 
in particular that of deeply buried bombs.14
For instance, the response requirements 
for ERW on the surface and at shallow depths 
vary significantly to that of the U.K.’s deep-
ly buried bombs, wherein the latter are miti-
gated reactively by default. A good example of 
this policy’s implementation is the construc-
tion project of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic 
Park in London prior to the Summer Olympic 
Games in 2012. The entire area was heavily 
bombed during WWII. Based on the bombing 
data, deeply buried ERW could emerge during 
the park’s construction.15 A risk assessment 
deliberately avoided proactive clearance of the 
park. The level of preparedness was raised for 
the reactive bomb disposal. After an air bomb 
was recovered, an expert examined it and, as 
anticipated, was unable to pinpoint the impli-
cations of corrosion in the metal and explosive 
components. However, the expert was able to 
establish whether the bomb presented a dan-
ger in its current location and the extent of 
protective works needed.
Lessons Learned
Central to managing residual ERW is strong national own-
ership of risk and response, and well-performing authorities 
with solid understanding of liability, operational efficien-
cy and risk management. ERW tasks are best suited to be the 
shared function and responsibility of civil defense and mili-
tary that maintain the budgets and mobile-response capacity.16
Following the organizational structure, suitable infor-
mation management and reporting systems differentiate be-
tween surface (and shallow subsurface) contamination and 
deeply buried bombs. Clearance of the former and other sur-
face items with particular humanitarian impact are included 
in States Parties’ obligations toward the CCM and APMBC. 
Such surface items include cluster munitions banned by the 
CCM and anti-personnel mines banned by the APMBC. Trea-
ties do not ban other items such as mortar bombs and hand 
grenades, but they are dangerous and render a humanitarian 
impact if detonated.
Deeply buried bombs cannot be easily surveyed over 
large areas nor can communities readily identify them; of-
ten they become a challenge only after being discovered dur-
ing construction and development activities. Therefore, most 
long-term contamination that does not pose immediate hu-
manitarian danger could be addressed by adopting a risk-
management approach and introducing more sustainable, 
Locations of bombs reported to have fallen during the period of the London 
Blitz in and around the area of the London Olympic Park.
Photo courtesy of www.bombsight.org.
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commercially viable response models. 
For financing institutions and donors, 
selecting such an approach would allow 
investment to focus on manageable and 
important tasks, not the all-encompass-
ing clearance of countries.
Conversely, national authorities 
would be responsible for developing 
policies to manage long-term residual 
ERW. In such an environment, prog-
ress would be defined in terms other 
than the sum of square meters cleared 
and number of ordnance destroyed. Re-
cent propositions for hundreds of years 
of continued ERW response in Laos 
and Vietnam should be significantly re-
duced by dissecting the contamination 
into its components and assessing the 
actual degrees of risk.
Lessons from the European WWII 
experience advocate moving away from 
proactive clearance practices and poli-
cies to responsive long-term survey and 
clearance mechanisms that are sustain-
able, proportional to the reduced threat 
and appropriate to the intended use of 
the contaminated land. Adoption of 
such policies would enable efficient re-
source allocation while providing better 
developed perceptions of residual ERW 
and associated risks. 
See endnotes page 65
The Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) be-
gan a study of post-1945 ERW response 
policies and practices in 2013, focusing 
on management of residual risks. The 
research project extends to 15 countries 
and serves to facilitate knowledge trans-
fer and advise policymaking on residual 
ERW among national governments and 
donors. Beyond this study, GICHD assists 
in developing sustainable national lead-
ership and capacities to confront residual 
contamination while increasing the role, 
and sharpening the structure of national 
security services in ERW response. 
Figure 1. Annual quantity of UXO disposed of in West Berlin (1,000 kg), 1947–2011.
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